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Abstract 
We cast fresh light on how and why Americans’ views on marijuana legalization 
shifted between 1973 and 2014. Results from age-period-cohort models show a 
strong negative effect of age and relatively high levels of support for legalization 
among baby boom cohorts. Despite the baby boom effect, the large increase in sup-
port for marijuana legalization is predominantly a broad, period-based change in 
the population. Additional analyses demonstrate that differences in support for le-
galization by education, region, and religion decline, that differences by political 
party increase, and that differences between whites and African Americans reverse 
direction. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings and by iden-
tifying promising directions for future research on this topic. 
Keywords: Marijuana, public opinion, social change 
digitalcommons.unl.edu
Published in The Sociological Quarterly, 58:3 (2017), 405-428,  
doi 10.1080/00380253.2017.1331715 
Copyright © 2017 Midwest Sociological Society. Published by Routledge/Taylor & Francis 
Group. Used by permission. 
Published online 12 June 2017.  
S chwadel  &  Ell ison in  The  So c iolo gical  Quarterly  58  (2017)       2
Currently, 25 states and the District of Columbia have passed laws per-
mitting the medical use of marijuana, and 4 states and the District of 
Columbia have legalized marijuana for recreational use, though con-
siderable friction remains over how to resolve the tensions between 
these state laws and federal anti-marijuana regulations. There is now 
an extensive marijuana industry, particularly in Colorado and Wash-
ington, with attendant tourism, legal battles over taxation and pub-
lic consumption, and issues related to production, marketing, and the 
economics of marijuana more broadly (Gove 2016; Scheuer 2015). Per-
haps the slate of legislative changes should not come as a great sur-
prise given trends in public opinion on the subject. According to both 
Pew and Gallup, a slight majority of Americans have supported the 
legalization of Marijuana since 2013 (Jones 2015; Motel 2015). This 
plurality support for legalization nationwide represents a dramatic 
reversal of fortunes for marijuana since the late 1980s, when there 
appeared to be a broad national consensus in favor of keeping mari-
juana illegal. Indeed, at that time less than one-quarter of U.S. adults 
endorsed legalization in most polls (Jones 2015; Motel 2015). 
Despite the significance of this reversal, how this occurred is not 
well-understood. Although researchers have occasionally examined cor-
relates of pro-legalization views using nationwide surveys, marijuana 
attitudes have usually been incorporated into broader investigations of 
social liberalism (e.g., Himmelstein and MacRae 1988; Hoffmann and 
Miller 1997). Other studies have focused on high school or college stu-
dents in an effort to gauge conservative or liberal winds (e.g., Hastings 
and Hoge 1986; Palamar 2014). While researchers have long demon-
strated keen interest in patterns and correlates of marijuana use—
among adolescents and adults—few if any investigators have under-
taken a thorough study of public opinion regarding legalization. This 
overall neglect of public opinion on marijuana legalization stands in 
marked contrast to the strong research focus on changes in other so-
cial attitudes, such as those involving gender roles, abortion, and ho-
mosexuality and same-sex marriage, which continue (quite appropri-
ately) to receive intense scrutiny (Loftus 2001; Sherkat et al. 2011). 
In this article, we ask: aside from the overall increase, how has sup-
port for marijuana legalization changed? We ask this in two distinct 
ways. First, has the increase in support occurred more rapidly among 
some segments of the population than in others? Those who were tra-
ditionally less likely to support marijuana legalization, such as women, 
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the lower classes, and evangelical Protestants, may have diminished in 
their relative opposition, leading to broader support for legalization 
across the population. This would comport with a social diffusion per-
spective on social change and cultural innovations (Rogers 2003). At 
the same time, new cleavages may have appeared or old ones increased. 
Here we are particularly focused on politics since research shows con-
siderable party polarization over the past few decades (Bafumi and Sha-
piro 2009; DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996). Second, did growth in 
support for marijuana legalization occur across time periods, reflecting 
change among the population as a whole, or was it driven by changes 
across generations, with younger birth cohorts being more likely than 
older cohorts to support legalization? Much research argues that chang-
ing support is at least partially motivated by differences across birth 
cohorts (e.g., Galston and Dionne 2013; Jones 2015; Nielsen 2010; Mo-
tel 2015), though others disagree (e.g., Caulkins et al. 2012). We bring 
newer techniques for simultaneously estimating period and cohort ef-
fects using repeated cross-sectional data to bear on this issue. 
In this study we seek to cast fresh light on how and why American 
public opinion on marijuana legalization shifted over the 1973–2014 
period. We use data from the General Social Survey (GSS) and hier-
archical age-period-cohort models (Yang and Land 2013), which not 
only provide estimates of period and cohort changes but also allow for 
random slopes that are used to estimate changes in key correlates of 
support for legalization. We derive expectations for changes in the ef-
fects of social class, religion, sex, race, political affiliation, and region 
from extant theoretical and empirical research. The results show that 
the increase in support for marijuana legalization is predominantly 
a period-based change, and that baby boom cohorts are relatively 
supportive of legalization. Models with random slopes reveal robust 
changes in who supports legalization across time periods—declines in 
the effects of education, region, and evangelical Protestant affiliation, 
a large increase in differences between Republicans and Democrats, 
and a reversal of differences between whites and African Americans. 
Moreover, we find that differences between men and women are de-
pressed, and income differences are exacerbated, among the inter-
war cohorts, born between 1915 and the 1930s. We conclude by dis-
cussing the implications of these findings for our understanding of 
the dramatic change in public opinion on marijuana legalization, and 
by identifying promising directions for future research on this topic. 
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Period and/or Cohort Change 
Social change, such as changes in support for the legalization of mar-
ijuana, can take place across periods and/or birth cohorts. A period is 
a specific point in time, and period effects imply changes among peo-
ple of all generations from one period to another period. A birth co-
hort, on the other hand, is a group of people who are born at approxi-
mately the same time, or within a specific window of time, and cohort 
effects are changes across these groups, regardless of age. Shifts in the 
approval of marijuana legalization may be due to changes in the per-
spectives of all people over a span of time, or to certain generations 
adopting particular views on the issue. 
The distinction between period and birth cohort change is abso-
lutely pivotal to understanding the processes of social change. Birth 
cohorts mature within specific historical eras, and consequently en-
counter distinct socialization experiences (Ryder 1965). These unique 
socialization influences may leave a lasting imprint on attitudes re-
garding marijuana and the laws that regulate it, particularly because 
such views often resist change as people age (Alwin and Krosnick 
1991). Indeed, generation-specific trauma, such as warfare and eco-
nomic recession, as well as the characteristics of a generation, such 
as size and demographic makeup, are seen as key motivators of so-
cial and political change (Edmunds and Turner 2002). Importantly, 
however, such social change is generally slow, relying on intergenera-
tional population replacement (Inglehart 1990). Rapid changes in so-
ciety, in reaction to political, legal, and technological changes, for ex-
ample, may instead result from changes in the population as a whole, 
or period effects. 
In the case of marijuana attitudes, there are obvious benefits to dis-
entangling the complex effects of age, period, and cohort correctly. 
Specific historical periods, and the events that occur within those pe-
riods such as changes in drug laws, popularized cases of drug use 
and abuse, and problems with the criminal justice system can pro-
duce period-based changes in views of marijuana (Nielsen 2010). The 
sharp increase in support for marijuana legalization since roughly 
1990 suggests the possibility of such a period effect (Musgrave and 
Wilcox 2014). Other rapid changes in social and political perspec-
tives, such as support for homosexuals’ rights and same-sex marriage, 
have been shown to be period-based rather than cohort-based changes 
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(e.g., Anderson and Fetner 2008; Schwadel and Garneau 2014). Im-
portantly, because period effects often reflect responses to specific po-
litical and cultural events, they may be less stable than cohort effects 
(e.g., Brulle, Carmichael, and Jenkins 2012; O’Brien 2000). Musgrave 
and Wilcox (2014:90) note this possibility when they conclude that “a 
more aggressive law-enforcement attitude may portend . . . another 
U-turn” in public opinion on marijuana. 
There are also sound reasons to anticipate that cohorts play a role 
in changes in views of marijuana. Certain cohorts may feel differ-
ently about marijuana laws than other cohorts. The baby boomers, 
for example, tend to hold distinctive attitudes on a number of social 
and policy issues (e.g., Cohn and Taylor 2010; Davis 2007); and, ac-
cording to some researchers, marijuana is one of those issues (e.g., 
Kandel et al. 2001). Regardless of the unique views of the baby boom 
generation, it is often argued that growing support for marijuana le-
galization more broadly occurs across successive birth cohorts, with 
younger cohorts maturing in more liberal social and political envi-
ronments. Unfortunately, these conclusions are based on analyses 
that potentially conflate cohort and age effects by either leaving age 
out of their models or assuming that age differences indicate cohort 
effects (e.g., Caulkins et al. 2012; Galston and Dionne 2013; Jones 
2015; Motel 2015; Nielsen 2010). Our analysis expands on previous 
research by employing advanced techniques for disentangling age, 
period, and cohort effects using repeated cross-sectional data. The 
hierarchical age-period-cohort models that we employ provide esti-
mates of the effect of each cohort (averaged across periods and con-
trolling for age) and the effect of each period (averaged across co-
horts and controlling for age) (Yang and Land 2013). By using this 
approach, we are able to unravel the effects of age, period, and co-
hort on attitudes about marijuana legalization. 
Period- and Cohort-Specific Correlates of Support for 
Legalization 
In addition to clarifying age, period, and cohort effects, we also inves-
tigate the possibility that key predictors of pro-legalization attitudes 
differ by cohort and period. Social, cultural, and demographic varia-
tions by period and/or birth cohort can alter the influence of factors 
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that affect attitudes about marijuana legalization. Variables that are 
strongly predictive of attitudes for one period or birth cohort may thus 
have little bearing on attitudes for other periods or cohorts. In par-
ticular, the extant literature suggests the possibility of period and/or 
cohort variation in the effects of sex, race, social class, religion, polit-
ical affiliation, and region. 
Women are generally less likely than men to support the legaliza-
tion of marijuana (Nielsen 2010; Palamar 2014), potentially due in 
part to differences in the perceived risk associated with marijuana 
(Pacek, Mauro, and Martins 2015) and differences in views of the util-
ity and cost of the enforcement of anti-marijuana laws (Galston and 
Dionne 2013). Recent research, however, suggests that differences 
in marijuana use between men and women—and thus possibly also 
views of marijuana—have declined (Johnson et al. 2015). Convergence 
in men’s and women’s attitudes on marijuana would comport with re-
search on changes in sex differences in other social and political at-
titudes (e.g., Astin 1998; Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Norris 1996). 
Although minority Americans—particularly African Americans and 
Mexican Americans—have long been popularly associated with mar-
ijuana use (Goode 1970; Schlosser 2003; Schroeder 1980), empiri-
cal research often finds little difference between whites’ and African 
Americans’ support for marijuana legalization (e.g., Galston and Di-
onne 2013; Nielsen 2010). Recent research, however, indicates that 
African Americans are now relatively likely to oppose medical mari-
juana (Tate 2014), see marijuana use as involving a great risk (Pacek 
et al. 2015), and, at least among young adults, abstain from marijuana 
use (American Civil Liberties Union 2013). These trends suggest that 
support for marijuana legalization may have become relatively more 
common among whites in recent periods and/or birth cohorts. 
Research since the 1960s indicates that support for marijuana le-
galization is disproportionately high among the middle and upper 
classes (e.g., Caulkins et al. 2012; Goode 1970), despite evidence that 
marijuana use is more common among the lower classes (Braun et al. 
2000). Research on cultural diffusion, however, suggests that novel 
social and political perspectives often disseminate across the popula-
tion. Those with high levels of income and education are seen as “in-
novators” and “early adopters” of cultural innovations, and the lower 
classes are often “laggards” in the adoption of cultural innovations 
(Rogers 2003; see also Elias 2000). Consequently, the link between 
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social class and attitudes regarding legalization may have declined 
across periods and/or birth cohorts (Musgrave and Wilcox 2014). 
Residents of the Pacific, New England, and Mountain Census Divi-
sions are comparatively receptive to pro-legalization views (Caulkins 
et al. 2012). The Pacific in particular—California, Washington, Oregon, 
Alaska, and Hawaii—is known for its relatively high rates of marijuana 
use and cultivation. For instance, three of the four states to legalize 
recreational marijuana are in the Pacific Division. Although the West 
Coast has long been receptive to unconventional values and lifestyles 
(Bainbridge 1989), and known for attracting in-migrants with coun-
tercultural sensibilities during the 1960s and 1970s, it is not clear how 
these patterns have been sustained. Not only has the Pacific popula-
tion changed demographically (Grieco et al. 2012), but the culture that 
supports legalization may have diffused to other areas of the country. 
Previous research shows that other cultural and even legal innova-
tions that first took root in the Pacific, such as hate crime laws, even-
tually spread to other states (Rogers 2003). This suggests the possi-
bility of declines in the association between living in the Pacific and 
pro-legalization attitudes (Caulkins et al. 2012). 
Although religion has historically been associated with moral and 
legal positions such as views of marijuana, there are reasons to be be-
lieve this association has changed along two dimensions. First, evan-
gelical Protestants have been less prone than people from other reli-
gious backgrounds to endorse the legalization of marijuana (Hoffmann 
and Miller 1997), possibly due to religious monitoring (Longest and 
Vaisey 2008), alignment with the Republican Party (Wald and Cal-
houn-Brown 2006), and conservative theology that emphasizes the 
doctrine of original sin and the avoidance of temptation (Hempel and 
Bartkowski 2008; Sherkat and Ellison 1997). The relative rise in evan-
gelicals’ social class (Schwadel 2014a) and their convergence with 
other Americans on various social perspectives (Farrell 2011), how-
ever, suggest potential convergence in marijuana attitudes between 
evangelical Protestants and other religious affiliates (Hoffmann and 
Miller 1997; cf. Smith and Johnson 2010). Second, the population of re-
ligiously unaffiliated Americans has grown considerably in recent de-
cades; and liberal attitudes such as views of marijuana appear to have 
encouraged this change (Hout and Fischer 2014; Putnam and Camp-
bell 2010). As the unaffiliated population has grown, however, it has 
become more heterogeneous and potentially changed in various ways 
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(Baker and Smith 2009; Voas 2015). For instance, the religiously un-
affiliated are no longer more highly educated than other Americans 
(Schwadel 2014a, 2014b). Changes to the unaffiliated population may 
have also led to a reduction in the association between religious non-
affiliation and support for marijuana legalization. 
Finally, it is likely that partisanship has become more relevant. 
There has been a considerable increase in ideological, issue-driven po-
litical polarization in the United States (Bafumi and Shapiro 2009). 
This is evident from the “striking divergence of attitudes between 
Democrats and Republicans” (DiMaggio et al. 1996:738). Political 
party differences have grown across a variety of social and political 
perspectives, including views of race, abortion, employment, health 
care, and sexuality (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Putnam and 
Campbell 2010). Some researchers argue that marijuana attitudes 
are a component of this party polarization, which suggests increas-
ing differences between Democrats and Republicans in their support 
for legalization (e.g., Musgrave and Wilcox 2014). Such polarization 
fits with a depiction of the Republican Party as increasingly focused 
on social conservatism more so than limited government (Miller and 
Schofield 2008). Conversely, others argue that partisan differences in 
marijuana attitudes are declining, and that this decline should be par-
ticularly evident in differences across birth cohorts (e.g., Gao 2015). 
In the analyses below, we adjudicate these competing claims as well 
as potential changes in the effects of race, sex, social class, region, and 
religion on support for marijuana legalization. 
Data 
We use data from the 1973–2014 General Social Survey to examine 
changes in support for the legalization of marijuana. The GSS is a na-
tionally representative survey of noninstitutionalized adults in the 
United States. The survey has been administered annually or biennially 
since 1972, generally though not always in-person. The question about 
legalization of marijuana was added to the GSS in 1973, though it was 
not included in the 1977, 1982, and 1985 surveys. The GSS response rate 
ranges between 69 percent and 80 percent, according to American As-
sociation for Public Opinion Research Response Rate 5 (AAPOR 2008). 
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The sample is restricted to those 25 years old and older to avoid limit-
ing variation in higher education. There are 26,441 cases after deleting 
cases with missing data on the dependent variable and the focal inde-
pendent variables. Another 134 cases are deleted due to missing data on 
control variables, resulting in a sample size of 26,307 (see Smith, Mars-
den, and Hout [2015] for more information on the GSS). 
Respondents were asked if they “think the use of marijuana should 
be made legal or not.” The response options were legal and not legal. 
We use a dichotomous dependent variable coded one for support for 
legalization and zero for no support for the legalization of marijuana 
(see Table 1 for descriptive statistics). Although legalization can be 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
                                                            Percent (Mean)                   Std. Dev.
Support Legalization of Marijuana  27.6
Female  55.7
African American  12.8
Other Race  4.5
White†  82.6
Bachelor’s Degree  23.1
High School Degree†  55.1
No High School Degree  21.8
Family Income  (10.376)  .946
Evangelical Protestant 26.3
No Religious Affiliation  10.6
Nonevangelical Religious Affiliate†  63.2
Religious Service Attendance  (3.939)  2.722
Democrat  38.2
Independent  34.3
Other Party  1.4
Republican†  26.0
Pacific  13.3
Mountain  6.3
New England  4.9
Other Census Divisions†  75.5
Agea  (47.837)  16.028
Married  57.7
Children in Home  38.7
Urban  22.0
Suburban  26.7
Rural  13.5
Other Urban†  37.8
N = 26,307; sample limited to respondents age 25 and older.
† Omitted reference category in regression models.
a. Age-squared and age-cubed included in models when statistically significant (p < .05).
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enacted in various ways, from allowing only personal use and culti-
vation to large-scale production and retail sales (Caulkins et al. 2015), 
this measure does not allow us to assess support for different forms 
of legalization but instead for legalization in general. 
The primary independent variables measure age, race, sex, reli-
gion, political party, social class, and region. Age is coded in years of 
age, centered on the mean of age. Age-squared and age-cubed are in-
cluded in the models when statistically significant (p < .05). Sex is 
measured with a dummy variable for female respondents, race with 
dummy variables for African American and other race respondents 
(white is omitted reference category), and political affiliation with 
dummy variables for Democrats, Independents, and affiliates of other 
parties (Republican is omitted reference category). Social class is as-
sessed with a family income variable (in constant dollars, logged to ad-
just for the skewed distribution) and dummy variables for bachelor’s 
degree and no high school degree (high school degree is omitted ref-
erence category). Religious affiliation is measured with dummy vari-
ables for no religious affiliation and evangelical Protestant affiliation 
(Steensland et al. 2000) (omitted reference category is nonevangeli-
cal religious affiliate, which includes nonevangelical Protestant, other 
Christian, and non-Christian religions). We also examine the changing 
impact of a nine-category measure of frequency of religious service 
attendance (from never to more than once a week) because evangeli-
cals attend religious services more often than most other Americans, 
and service attendance is strongly associated with views of marijuana 
(Galston and Dionne 2013). Region is measured with dummy vari-
ables for the Pacific, Mountain, and New England Census Divisions, 
which have relatively high levels of support for legalization (Caulkins 
et al. 2012) (omitted reference category is all other divisions, including 
Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlan-
tic, East South Central, and West South Central). The models include 
controls in the form of dummy variables for marital status, children 
(under 18) in the home, and urbanity (large urban area, suburb, and 
rural, with other urban as omitted reference category) as family for-
mation and city size are associated with views of marijuana (Nielsen 
2010; Palamar 2014). 
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Analysis Technique 
The extant age-period-cohort (APC) literature suggests conducting 
model specification tests to ascertain if all three factors are relevant 
(e.g., Chaves 1991; Firebaugh 1997; Land 2011). To do so, we compare 
results from partial and full fixed-effects APC binary logistic regres-
sion models of support for the legalization of marijuana (see Yang, 
Fu, and Land 2004). These models include dummy variables for age 
groups, periods, and cohorts. Birth cohorts are coded in five-year in-
tervals. Respondents born before 1900 and after 1984 are grouped 
into their own cohorts due to the limited number of respondents at 
the tail ends of the cohort distribution. Each survey year is a time pe-
riod. We use five-year age groups to limit the number of variables 
(note that this coding of age differs from the focal analyses below). 
The 1991 period, the 1940–44 cohort, and the 55–59 age group are the 
omitted reference categories. Table 2 reports model fit statistics com-
paring the partial models to the full fixed-effects APC model. A signif-
icant likelihood ratio test indicates that the full APC model provides 
a better fit. As Table 2 shows, the full APC model fits the data signifi-
cantly better than each of the reduced models. Thus, an APC approach 
appears best for understanding changes in support for the legaliza-
tion of marijuana. 
Table 2. Likelihood ratio tests of model fit for full APC model relative to partial models, from 
binary logistic regression models of support for legalization of marijuana with dummy vari-
ables for five-year birth cohorts, single-year periods, and five-year age categories.
                                                               Likelihood Ratio Statistic      Degrees of Freedom
Age Only  1795.374***  42
Period Only  753.833***  30
Cohort Only  740.481***  36
Age and Period  148.941***  18
Age and Cohort  521.464***  24
Period and Cohort  49.178***  12
Age, Period, and Cohort  —
Omitted reference categories are ages 55–59, period 1991, and cohort 1940–44; sample 
limited to respondents age 25 and older; N = 26,307. 
* p ≤ .05 ; ** p ≤ .01 ; and *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed test)
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In conventional APC models, such as the fixed-effect analyses re-
ported in Table 2, “age, time period, and birth cohort are considered 
same-level factors affecting the outcome of interest” (Yang and Land 
2013:18). Recent research, however, suggests that repeated cross-sec-
tional APC data should be viewed as hierarchical data where each re-
spondent is nested in a period by cohort cell (Yang and Land 2103). 
Research based on respondents nested within social contexts, such as 
schools or churches, is generally approached from a multilevel per-
spective due to the likelihood of shared random error within each 
context (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Similarly, shared random er-
ror among those born at about the same time or surveyed in close 
temporal proximity should be incorporated into the analyses. As Yang 
(2008:211) notes, “Adequate models must take into account this level-2 
heterogeneity for valid statistical inference.” Failure to do so may re-
sult in underestimated standard errors and increased probability of 
type I error (Hox and Kreft 1994). 
Hierarchical age-period-cohort (HAPC) models take the nested 
structure of APC data into account by treating periods and cohorts as 
cross-classified level-2 units of analysis in a multilevel model (Yang 
and Land 2013). Individuals are the level-1 unit of analysis, and age is 
modeled as a fixed-effects individual-level variable. A logit link func-
tion adjusts for the dichotomous dependent variable. The individual 
or level-1 equation is as follows: 
Logit (Support Marijuana Legalization)ijk 
= β0jk + β1Aijk + β2Fijk + β3AAijk + β4ORijk + β5BDijk + β6NHSijk 
+ β7INijk + β8EPijk + β9NRijk + β10SAijk + β11Dijk + β12Iijk 
+ β13OPijk + β14Pijk + β15Mijk + β16NEijk +∑
p
p=5 βpXp + eijk 
Each individual (i) is nested in both a birth cohort (j) and a period (k), 
β0jk is the intercept or cell mean for respondents in cohort j and pe-
riod k, β1 through β16 are the individual-level fixed effects for age, fe-
male, African American, other race, bachelor’s degree, no high school 
degree, income, evangelical Protestant, no religious affiliation, ser-
vice attendance, Democrat, Independent, other party, Pacific, Moun-
tain, and New England, βp represents other individual- level fixed ef-
fects (i.e., control variables), and eijk is the individual-level error term. 
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The level-2 model is as follows: 
β0jk = γ0 + u0j + v0k 
In this equation, γ0 is the model intercept, which is the overall mean 
of support for marijuana legalization, and u0j and v0k are the residual 
random effects of cohort and period, respectively. Using these resid-
ual random effects, we examine the effect of each cohort (averaged 
across all periods) and the effect of each period (averaged across all 
cohorts). A key feature of HAPC models is the ability to incorporate 
random slopes, for example: 
β2jk = γ2 + u2j + v2k 
In this equation, γ2 is an example fixed-effect coefficient for an indi-
vidual-level variable (e.g., female), u2j is the cohort-specific effect of 
that variable, and v2k is the period-specific effect. 
HAPC models are particularly suited to the current research be-
cause they include random intercepts that indicate variation from 
the overall mean for each period and birth cohort, and they allow 
for random slopes that specify changes in the effects of independent 
variables across periods and birth cohorts. Recent research suggests 
that HAPC models provide reliable results if certain key criteria are 
met, namely, that there are period effects and that the period, co-
hort, and outcome variables are not collinear (Reither et al. 2015). 
Importantly, our results are robust to alternative age, period, and co-
hort intervals, which is the most serious criticism of the models (Luo 
and Hodges 2015), and the patterns identified reflect those in age by 
year and cohort by year trend analyses.1 All independent variables 
are centered on their overall means and the models are weighted 
and conducted in HLM 7. 
1. Alternative models with various age, period, and cohort intervals show similar 
results. For instance, we repeated the entire HAPC analysis (i.e., Tables 3 and 4) 
with five-year age groups, two-year periods, and eight-year cohorts. The substan-
tive findings are largely unchanged (results available on request). Graphs of age 
by year and cohort by year change in support for legalization are also indicative 
of the robust period effects we observe here (available on request). 
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Results 
Age, Period, and Cohort Effects 
We assess age, period, and cohort effects on support for the legaliza-
tion of marijuana with Models 1 and 2 in Table 3. Model 1 includes 
only age variables while Model 2 includes age, other focal indepen-
dent variables, and control variables. Recall that period and cohort ef-
fects are derived from random level-2 intercepts. The age, period, and 
cohort effects from Models 1 and 2 are depicted in Figure 1. Age, age-
squared, and age-cubed are each significant in Model 1. As the dashed 
line in Figure 1a shows, age has a strong, negative effect on support 
for marijuana legalization, with the probability declining from .39 to 
.10 across the adult life course (Model 1). The effect of age, particu-
larly the high levels of support among younger adults, is partially me-
diated in Model 2, with the probability of support declining from less 
than .32 to .10. 
The variance components for the period intercept indicate signifi-
cant variation in support for marijuana legalization across time peri-
ods in both Model 1 (.3615) and Model 2 (.2961). As Figure 1b shows, 
the estimated period effects are similar across the two models. Sup-
port for marijuana legalization increased in the mid-1970s but then 
declined in the early 1980s. The probability of support for legalization 
remained low through the remainder of the 1980s, averaging under 
.15 from 1983 to 1990 (both Models 1 and 2). Support for the legal-
ization of marijuana then increased considerably in a relatively linear 
manner from 1990 to 2014. In 2014, the estimated probability of sup-
port for legalization was over .5 in both the partial and full models. 
The variance component for the birth cohort intercept is also sig-
nificant in both Model 1 (.0343) and Model 2 (.0257). Figure 1c sug-
gests that cohorts that fall within the baby boom generation—specifi-
cally the 1945 through 1964 cohorts—are disproportionately likely to 
support the legalization of marijuana. This is particularly evident in 
the partial model, with an average estimated probability of support 
of .28 for the 1945 through 1964 cohorts, compared to .22 for the re-
maining cohorts. 
Overall, the results in Table 3 and Figure 1 indicate that the trend of 
increasing support for marijuana legalization is largely due to period 
S chwadel  &  Ell ison in  The  So c iolo gical  Quarterly  58  (2017)        15
Table 3. Hierarchical age-period-cohort models of support for legalization of marijuana.
                                                                 Model 1                               Model 2
Fixed Effects                                        b                      se                 b                      se
Intercept  –1.207  .130***  –1.254  .117***
Female    –.283  .034***
African Americana    –.044  .057
Other Racea    –.702  .087***
Bachelor’s Degreeb    .322  .042***
No High School Degreeb    –.409  .052***
Family Income    .058  .023*
Evangelical Protestantc    –.257  .042***
No Religious Affiliationc    .334  .055***
Service Attendance    –.162  .007***
Democratd    .468  .047***
Independentd    .446  .046***
Other Partyd    .733  .133***
Pacifice    .306  .049***
Mountaine    .061  .069
New Englande    .323  .075***
Age  –.016  .003***  –.013  .003***
Age-Squaredf  .041  .009***  .015  .010
Age-Cubedf  –.002  .000***  –.001  .000*
Married    –.442  .040***
Children in Home    –.166  .041***
Urbang    .193  .047***
Suburbang    .106  .043*
Ruralg    –.101  .058
Random Effects                            Variance Component              Variance Component
Period Intercept  .3615***   .2961***
Cohort Intercept  .0343***   .0257***
N = 26,307; sample limited to respondents ages 25 and older. 
* p ≤ .05 ; ** p ≤ .01 ; and *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed test)
a. White omitted reference category.
b. High School Degree omitted reference category.
c. Nonevangelical Protestant religious affiliate omitted reference category.
d. Republican omitted reference category.
e. Other Census Divisions omitted reference category.
f. Coefficient and standard error multiplied by 100.
g. Other urban omitted reference category.
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Figure 1. Estimated age, period, and cohort effects on support for legalization of 
marijuana. Figure graphs results from Models 1 and 2 in Table 3. 
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effects but there is still considerable across-cohort variation in support 
for legalization. Among the focal variables, female, other race, no high 
school degree, evangelical Protestant, and service attendance have 
negative effects on support for marijuana legalization while bache-
lor’s degree, family income, no religious affiliation, Democrat, Inde-
pendent, other party, Pacific, and New England have positive effects 
(Model 2). These effects are often moderate to large. For instance, the 
odds of supporting legalization are (℮.334=) 40 percent greater for re-
ligious nonaffiliates than for nonevangelical religious affiliates, 60 
percent greater for Democrats than for Republicans, and 38 percent 
greater for the college educated than for those with only a high school 
degree. However, these are aggregate effects, averaged across all pe-
riods and birth cohorts. Next, we turn to how the effects of the focal 
predictors change across periods and birth cohorts. 
Changes in Effects of Sex, Race, Social Class, Religion, Political 
Party, and Region 
We add random slopes to key variables to assess how the effects of 
those variables change across periods and birth cohorts. The num-
ber of periods (N = 25) and cohorts (N = 19) limit the degrees of free-
dom, thereby precluding the inclusion of all potentially relevant ran-
dom slopes in a single model. Consequently, we test for random slopes 
in batches in Models 3 through 7 in Table 4. Model 8 includes each of 
the statistically significant random slopes from Models 3 through 7. 
Across-cohort variation in the effects of bachelor’s degree and evan-
gelical Protestant, which were marginally significant in Models 4 and 
6, respectively, are no longer significant in Model 8. Each of the other 
random slopes included in Model 8 remains significant. We examine 
the substantive impact of these random slopes in Figures 2 through 
7, which depict estimated group-specific probabilities across periods 
and cohorts. 
The random cohort slope for female from Model 8 (variance com-
ponent = .0327) is visually displayed in Figure 2. This figure shows 
little difference between men and women among those born between 
1915 and 1939. In other words, the negative effect of female is rela-
tively small for the latter half of the greatest generation and the bulk 
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Table 4. Random slopes (variance components) from hierarchical age-period-cohort models of support for 
legalization of marijuana.
 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8
Period
Female  .0041
African Americana  .0798***      .1067***
Other Racea  .0082
No High School Degreeb   .0499**     .0588**
Bachelor’s Degreeb   .0337**     .0397**
Family Income   .0021
Pacifice    .0672***    .0646***
Mountaine    .0137
New Englande    .0450
Evangelical Protestantc     .0646***   .0578***
No Religious Affiliationc     .0343*   .0341*
Service Attendance     .0002
Democratd      .0230*  .0210**
Independentd      .0039
Other Partyd      .0153
Birth Cohort
Female  .0232***      .0327***
African Americana  .0086
Other Racea  .0509
No High School Degreeb   .0011
Bachelor’s Degreeb   .0322*     .0265
Family Income   .0015*     .0055**
Pacifice    .0122
Mountaine    .0086
New Englande    .0098
Evangelical Protestantc     .0328*   .0268
No Religious Affiliationc     .0137
Service Attendance     .0004
Democratd      .0028
Independentd      .0003
Other Partyd      .0074
N = 26,307; sample limited to respondents ages 25 and older; all models include all of the above indepen-
dent variables as well as age, marital status, children in the home, and urbanity.
* p ≤ .05 ; ** p ≤ .01 ; and *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed test)
a. White omitted reference category.
b. High School Degree omitted reference category.
c. Nonevangelical Protestant religious affiliate omitted reference category.
d. Republican omitted reference category.
e. Other Census Divisions omitted reference category.
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of the silent generation. The difference in marijuana support between 
men and women is particularly large among baby boomers. This sug-
gests that the relatively high levels of support for marijuana legaliza-
tion among baby boomers (see Figure 1b) is disproportionately driven 
by men. 
The results from Model 8 indicate that the effect of African Ameri-
can varies significantly across periods (variance component = .1067). 
This period variation in the effect of race is shown in Figure 3. African 
Americans were relatively likely to support marijuana legalization in 
Figure 2. Estimated birth cohort changes in support for legalization of marijuana 
by sex. Figure graphs results from Model 8 in Table 4. 
Figure 3. Estimated period changes in support for legalization of marijuana by race. 
Figure graphs results from Model 8 in Table 4.  
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the 1970s. Average probability of support for legalization in 1973–78 
was more than .26 for African Americans and less than .20 for whites. 
African Americans and whites reported similar levels of support for 
legalization in the 1980s and 1990s. In a reversal from the 1970s, Af-
rican Americans were less likely than whites to support marijuana le-
galization in the 2000s. Average probability of support for legalization 
in 2000–2014 was .31 for African Americans and .38 for whites. Al-
though there is considerable growth in support for legalization among 
all three racial categories in the twenty-first century, whites now ap-
pear to be the most supportive of marijuana legalization. 
The effects of both bachelor’s degree (variance component = .0397) 
and no high school degree (variance component = .0588) vary signif-
icantly across periods in Model 8. Figure 4 shows large educational 
differences between 1973 and 1980, with the college educated being 
considerably more likely than those with less education to support le-
galization. Similar to race, these differences were reduced for much 
of the 1980s and 1990s. Beginning in the late 1990s, educational dif-
ferences again grew large, but the primary distinction came to be be-
tween those with no high school degree and other Americans. By 2014, 
there was little difference in the probability of support for those with 
a bachelor’s degree (.55) and those with a high school degree (.54), 
while the probability of support for legalization was far lower among 
those with no high school degree (.40). 
Figure 4. Estimated period changes in support for legalization of marijuana by high-
est degree earned. Figure graphs results from Model 8 in Table 4.  
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Across-cohort variation in the effect of family income (variance 
component = .0055) from Model 8 is depicted in Figure 5. As this fig-
ure shows, there are notable income differences in support for mar-
ijuana legalization among those born between 1915 and 1939 but 
relatively small income differences among other birth cohorts. The 
average difference in the probability of supporting legalization be-
tween those 1.5 standard deviations above and below the mean of 
family income is .08 for the 1915 to 1939 cohorts and less than .03 for 
the remaining cohorts. Moreover, the results in Figure 5 suggest that 
the across-cohort variation in support for legalization reported above 
(see Figure 1b) is disproportionately due to changes among lower-in-
come families. 
The effect of Pacific (variance component = .0646) varies across 
periods in Model 8 in Table 4. This variation is illustrated in Figure 6. 
Along with living in New England, living in the Pacific Census Division 
was associated with higher than average support for marijuana legal-
ization in the 1970s, 1980s, and the first half of the 1990s.2 From 1973 
to 1994, for example, average estimated probability of support for le-
galization was .24 for those in the Pacific and .16 for those in census 
Figure 5. Estimated birth cohort changes in support for legalization of marijuana 
by family income. Figure graphs results from Model 8 in Table 4. 
2. Unfortunately, the public version of the GSS does not indicate the specific state 
respondents live in. We suspect that the Mountain Census Division would appear 
more supportive of marijuana legalization if Utah could be separated from the 
remainder of the area. 
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divisions other than the Pacific, Mountain, and New England. This 
large regional difference in support for marijuana legalization disap-
peared in more recent periods. In particular, there was no difference 
between those in the Pacific and those in census divisions other than 
the Pacific and New England between 2008 and 2014. 
Figure 7 depicts period-based variation in the effects of evangelical 
Protestant (variance component = .0578) and unaffiliated (variance 
component = .0341) from Model 8. Differences between evangelicals 
Figure 6. Estimated period changes in support for legalization of marijuana by cen-
sus division. Figure graphs results from Model 8 in Table 4.  
Figure 7. Estimated period changes in support for legalization of marijuana by re-
ligious affiliation. Figure graphs results from Model 8 in Table 4.  
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and other religious affiliates were especially large in the 1970s, with 
an average probability of support for legalization that was less than 
.14 for evangelicals and more than .22 for other religious affiliates. 
This difference disappeared for much of the 1980s but then reemerged 
in the mid- to late 1990s. Despite fluctuation in the effect of evangel-
ical Protestant after the 1990s, the difference in support for legaliza-
tion between evangelicals and other religious affiliates has generally 
been relatively small in the twenty-first century (average difference 
in probability of support less than .04). For the most part, the unaf-
filiated are more likely than religiously affiliated Americans to sup-
port legalization across periods, though more so in some periods (e.g., 
1970s and 1980s) than in others (e.g., 1990s). 
Finally, period-based changes in the effect of Democrat (variance 
component = .0210) from Model 8 in Table 4 are shown in Figure 8. 
Democrats were more likely than Republicans to support marijuana 
legalization in each period, but there was a robust increase in the ef-
fect of Democrat in the twenty-first century. The average difference in 
the probability of supporting legalization between Democrats and Re-
publicans was less than .06 in 1973–2000 but grew to .15 in 2002–14. 
In 2014, estimated probability of support for legalization was .59 for 
Democrats and .40 for Republicans. Affiliates of other parties are par-
ticularly likely to support legalization, which should not be surprising 
as this category includes both liberal parties such as the Green Party 
Figure 8. Estimated period changes in support for legalization of marijuana by po-
litical party. Figure graphs results from Model 8 in Table 4.  
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and conservative parties such as the Libertarian Party that may lean 
toward legalization due to its emphasis on small government. None-
theless, Democrats are as likely as affiliates of other parties to sup-
port legalization in the twenty-first century. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
We began this study by noting that public opinion polling organiza-
tions have reported dramatic increases in levels of popular support 
for the legalization of marijuana. At the same time, we pointed to a 
curious neglect in the research literature, as few if any social and be-
havioral scientists have investigated the dynamics or reasons under-
lying this substantial opinion shift. Against this backdrop, our study 
had two main objectives: (a) to disentangle the role of period versus 
cohort effects in driving the sharp increase in pro-legalization atti-
tudes; and (b) to examine period and cohort variations in the effects 
of key predictors on marijuana attitudes. 
With respect to the first of these issues, we found unambiguous ev-
idence of a dramatic period effect on pro-legalization views, and evi-
dence of smaller cohort variations. It appears that the strong increase 
in public approval of legalization stems not from changes across suc-
cessive birth cohorts, but rather it reflects broad-based warming of 
America’s tangled history with marijuana from 1990 to 2014. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, the primary evidence for cohort-specific patterns in-
volved members of the baby boomer generation, that is, those born 
between 1945 and 1964. Baby boomers were at the forefront of the 
countercultural movements of the 1960s and early 1970s, and these 
direct or vicarious experiences appear to have left a lasting stamp on 
many of the attitudes and behaviors of baby boomers, making them 
more progressive on average than those who came earlier and later. 
Overall, however, the importance of cohort effects was swamped in 
our analysis by broad-based period effects on support for marijuana 
legalization. A primary motivation for conducting cohort analyses is 
to separate age effects from cohort effects (Glenn 2005). Indeed, our 
results suggest that what some researchers interpret as cohort ef-
fects (e.g., Galston and Dionne 2013; Jones 2015; Nielsen 2010; Motel 
2015) are instead large differences in support for legalization across 
the adult life course. 
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There may be several reasons for the strong period effects we ob-
serve. Marijuana has become increasingly widespread and visible 
in American society. It is now available in nearly every community, 
neighborhood, and social stratum (Ford and Beveridge 2006), and in-
creasingly large numbers of adults have experimented with marijuana 
(Galston and Dionne 2013; National Institutes of Health 2015). Mari-
juana now carries less of a sense of threat (Pacek et al. 2015), which 
can produce broad, period-based change in support for legalization. 
Period effects such as we observe with marijuana attitudes may also 
be influenced by political and cultural phenomena. Indeed, marijuana 
is not uncommon in movies or on television, and its use has been in-
creasingly popularized by celebrities, musicians, and other elements of 
popular culture (e.g., Herd 2008). Even U.S. presidents have acknowl-
edged trying marijuana. Moreover, in contrast to earlier periods, mar-
ijuana has received good press in some quarters, with many health 
professionals coming to  recognize its benefits for persons coping with 
serious illness and other debilitating health conditions. At the same 
time, there are signs of battle fatigue in the war on drugs, especially 
this drug, due to growing recognition of the social, fiscal, and consti-
tutional costs associated with our largely unsuccessful efforts to reg-
ulate the flow and use of marijuana (Provine 2011). Finally, while the 
advent of legal medical marijuana may be an indicator of a gradual in-
crease in public comfort with the drug, the medical marijuana move-
ment may also be a driver of the period effects observed in the GSS 
data (Schuermeyer et al. 2014). Any or all of these factors may have 
contributed to the surge in pro-legalization views among U.S. adults. 
In addition to disentangling period and cohort effects on support 
for marijuana legalization, we also set out to examine whether the ef-
fects of key predictors of attitudes toward legalization vary by period 
or cohort. Several interesting findings emerged from this phase of the 
analysis. First, there are few meaningful across-cohort changes in the 
correlates of support for legalization. For the most part, the factors 
that influenced Americans of one generation on this issue also influ-
enced other generations. The primary exceptions appear to be sex and 
family income. Unlike other birth cohorts, there is no meaningful dif-
ference in support for legalization between men and women born be-
tween roughly 1915 and the 1930s. Conversely, differences by family 
income are particularly large among the same interwar birth cohorts. 
As Elder (1974) influentially argued, the Great Depression may have 
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had a lasting impact on those who matured around that time, in this 
case dampening men’s greater likelihood of supporting marijuana le-
galization but not the relatively high levels of support among Ameri-
cans who are more well-to-do. 
Convergence across periods was evident with region, education, 
and religion. These changes are key to period-based growth in support 
for legalization, as the high school-educated, evangelical Protestants, 
and those outside of the Pacific Census Division caught up to the col-
lege-educated, other religious affiliates, and those living in the Pacific 
area, respectively. These findings comport with research on diffusion 
that points to the West Coast and especially the highly educated as “in-
novators” and “early adopters” of cultural innovations (Rogers 2003). 
Changes in the composition of the Pacific, college-educated, and 
evangelical populations may also be relevant here. For instance, there 
was considerable migration from other parts of the United States to 
the West Coast in the 1960s and 1970s (Suchan et al. 2007), when 
many were drawn there because of its openness and tolerance of di-
verse lifestyles, while the Pacific population was influenced by large 
numbers of international immigrants in the 1990s and 2000s (Grieco 
et al. 2012). Similarly, college education has increased rapidly (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2006). The disappearance of differences in support 
for legalization between college- and high school-educated Americans 
could well reflect the strong selectivity into higher education among 
people who went to college when access was more limited (Wuthnow 
and Mellinger 1978). This finding contributes to recent research show-
ing declining effects of education on other “liberal” attitudes tradition-
ally associated with higher education (e.g., Pampel and Hunter 2012; 
Schwadel 2014b). Importantly, however, the least-educated Ameri-
cans—those without a high school diploma—still report relatively low 
levels of support for the legalization of marijuana. In regard to evan-
gelical Protestants, they have become more like other Americans in 
various ways, including in their social class (Schwadel 2014a) and 
their views of some, but not all, social issues (Farrell 2011). Marijuana 
legalization appears to be one of those issues. While evangelicals’ sup-
port for legalization is now more similar to that of other religious affil-
iates than it was in the 1970s, they are still moderately less likely than 
other religious affiliates, and considerably less likely than the unaffil-
iated, to support legalization. Although we found no support for the 
kind of cohort differences among evangelicals that were forecast by 
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Hunter (1987) and others, it is possible that closer attention to inter-
nal heterogeneity within conservative Protestantism—by education or 
theological subculture, for example— could illuminate these patterns. 
In contrast to education, religion, and region, there was consider-
able divergence between Democrats’ and Republicans’ support for le-
galization. Political differences now dwarf most other social cleavages 
on the issue. This constitutes yet another component of contempo-
rary political polarization, along with views of homosexuality, abor-
tion, race, and gender roles (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Bafumi 
and Shapiro 2009; DiMaggio et al. 1996). As support for legalization 
has become a majority opinion, it has also become a particularly non-
Republican perspective. Thus the plurality in support is only at the 
aggregate. 
While African Americans were relatively likely to support mari-
juana legalization in the 1970s (and possibly before), they have been 
notably less likely than whites to do so in the twenty-first century. 
These results, as well as research showing relatively high levels of 
marijuana abstinence among young African Americans (American Civil 
Liberties Union 2013), represent a reversal from the historic associa-
tion between nonwhite America and marijuana (Goode 1970; Schlosser 
2003). Of course, this does not mean that the popular image of Af-
rican Americans as marijuana users and supporters of legalization 
will necessarily follow suit, particularly since African American mar-
ijuana users are more likely than white users to be arrested (Nguyen 
and Reuter 2012). 
Although this study has offered an initial investigation of the pro-
cesses underlying the dramatic shift in public opinion about marijuana 
legalization, there is more work to be done. Perhaps the first task is 
to clarify the meaning of our measure of pro-legalization attitudes. 
One virtue of the GSS survey item is its longevity; the same item has 
been asked for four decades, and it has also been used by many other 
polling organizations. However, it will be important to determine ex-
actly what contemporary respondents mean when they answer in the 
affirmative. For example, are they really expressing support only for 
medical marijuana? Are respondents actually signaling support for de-
criminalization? Do they favor the legalization of production only for 
personal use or do they support a full-scale marijuana industry, and if 
the latter, would they prefer a regime of regulation and taxation sim-
ilar to the one used for alcohol? Disentangling these nuanced issues 
S chwadel  &  Ell ison in  The  So c iolo gical  Quarterly  58  (2017)       28
will be crucial to understanding what the growing support for legal-
ization of marijuana in public opinion polls could actually mean for 
social policy. Clearly a significant change has occurred in the way in 
which Americans view marijuana laws since roughly 1990. We have 
drawn attention to the curious analytical neglect of these substantial 
shifts in public opinion, even as scholars have focused considerable 
energy on analyzing patterns and correlates of changes in opinion on 
other social issues, such as gender roles, abortion attitudes, and ho-
mosexuality and gay rights. The magnitude of opinion change on mar-
ijuana is more dramatic than most, and it begs for closer investigation 
in the future. We hope this study sparks further interest in the topic. 
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